We examine the pro…tability and the welfare implications of price discrimination in twosided markets. Platforms have information about the preferences of the agents that allows them to price discriminate within each group. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontally di¤erentiated markets is that price discrimination hurts the …rms and bene…ts consumers, prisoners' dilemma. Moreover, it is well-known that the presence of indirect externalities in two-sided markets intensi…es the competition. Despite all these, we show that the possibility of price discrimination, in a two-sided market, may actually soften the competition. Therefore, the implications of price discrimination assuming that the market is one-sided may not carry over to two-sided markets. This is the case regardless of whether prices are public or private, although private prices boost pro…ts. Our analysis also sheds light on the welfare properties of price discrimination in intermediate goods markets, such as Business-to-Business (B2B) markets.
Introduction
Two-sided markets have recently received signi…cant attention in the industrial organization literature [e.g., Armstrong (2007) , Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2005) ]. Two-sided (or multiple-sided) markets are markets that are organized around intermediaries or "platforms" with two (or multiple) sides who should join a platform in order for successful exchanges (trade) to take place. Indirect network externalities play an important role in these markets. For example, videogame platforms (e.g., Nintendo, Sony, Microsoft) need to attract both gamers and game developers. TV networks need to attract advertisers and viewers. 1 Credit cards need merchants and users. 2 More formally, a two-sided market is de…ned as a one where the volume of transactions between end-users depends on the structure of the fees and not only on the overall level of fees charged by platforms [Rochet and Tirole (2005) ].
The development of the Internet and the rapid growth of sophisticated software tools have enabled …rms to collect large amounts of information about consumer preferences, characteristics and purchasing history. Firms can use such information to segment consumers into distinct groups and target each group with di¤erent prices and products of di¤erent qualities and attributes. 3 The purpose of this paper is to study the issue of price discrimination in two-sided markets. There exists a relatively large literature on oligopolistic price discrimination in "one-sided" markets, 4 but this paper is among the …rst ones that examine this problem in the context of a two-sided market. 5 We assume that there are two platforms that are horizontally di¤erentiated. The literature on price discrimination in one-sided markets where products are horizontally di¤erentiated suggests-under the standard Hotelling-type assumptions-that price discrimination leads to lower prices and pro…ts for the …rms (prisoners'dilemma). 6 The reason is best response asymmetry [Corts (1998) ]. 7 Under horizontal di¤erentiation, one …rm's strong market is the other …rm's weak market and vice versa. When price discrimination is feasible, a …rm can charge a low price to the loyal customers of the rival …rm, while at the same time it can keep its price high to its own loyal customers. The problem is that the other …rm can follow the same strategy, resulting in a very intense competition among the …rms for consumers.
Therefore, the conventional wisdom is that, in markets with roughly symmetric …rms and products that are horizontally di¤erentiated, price discrimination is bene…cial for the consumers (at least on average). 8 The advice then given to policymakers and antitrust authorities is that they should not worry much about …rms acquiring and using consumer information with the intention to customize prices, because after all …rm competition for each consumer dissipates pro…ts and transfers most of the surplus to consumers.
Furthermore, it is well-known that the presence of indirect externalities in two-sided markets can intensify the competition, Armstrong (2007) . Therefore, one would expect that price discrimination in a two-sided market will generate a very competitive environment with low prices and pro…ts. Nevertheless, we show that the possibility of price discrimination may actually soften the competition, even in a market with symmetric and horizontally di¤erentiated platforms. The game need not be a prisoners' dilemma. In particular, price discrimination in two-sided markets is possible to increase prices for (almost) all consumers relative to uniform prices. Our result has important theoretical and policy implications because it demonstrates that price discrimination is more likely to be anti-competitive in two-sided markets than it is in one-sided markets. More fundamentally, it suggests that two-sided markets can be very di¤erent from one-sided markets. An interesting implication is that …rms in two-sided markets may seek to acquire customer information (in order to facilitate price discrimination) more aggressively than in one-sided markets.
Our analysis can also apply to intermediate goods markets where price discrimination is more likely to raise antitrust concerns than in …nal goods markets. Indeed, in the Unites States price discrimination is illegal in intermediate goods markets under the Robinson-Patman act. Each platform in our model can be viewed as a Business-to-Business (B2B) website which matches input suppliers with producers [e.g., Caillaud and Jullien (2003) ]. The Internet facilitates the collection and application of information about the users'preferences and characteristics and price cuts can only be observed by targeted agents. 9 An interesting question which arises then is whether platforms should be restricted to charge uniform prices. We will return to this interpretation of our model later.
The model we develop consists of two platforms that are horizontally di¤erentiated. There are two groups of agents and each agent is assumed to join only one platform (single-homing). Agents from one group that contemplate joining a given platform care about the number of agents from 8 When some kind of …rm asymmetry is introduced the game may no longer be a prisoners'dilemma, e.g., Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) and Liu and Serfes (2005a) . Price discrimination bene…ts the …rm with the larger market share. 9 See the FTC report on "Competition policy in the world of B2B electronic market places." Whether all prices are observable by all agents is crucial in the presence of network externalities. As we show the equilibrium depends on the price observability assumption. the other group that will join the same platform. 10 This (indirect) externality is captured by the cross-group externality parameters. Each platform charges lump-sum prices. Under a uniform pricing rule each member of a group that joins a platform pays the same price (across groups the prices of a platform are allowed to di¤er). Under price discrimination each agent pays a di¤erent price (perfect price discrimination). We show that if the cross-group externality parameters are high enough price discrimination increases platform pro…ts and hurts consumer welfare.
The intuition for this result is as follows. A uniform equilibrium price charged by a platform to (say) group 1 agents balances optimally the following three e¤ects: i) loss (gain) of inframarginal rents, ii) gain (loss) of marginal agents from group 1 and iii) gain (loss) of agents from group 2. The third e¤ect is called a feedback e¤ect and it has to do with the two-sidedness of the market. A price reduction to group 1 …rst increases the number of group 1 agents who join the platform. This induces more group 2 agents to join the platform, which in turn allows the platform to extract more revenue from group 1 agents. This feedback e¤ect is responsible for lowering the equilibrium (uniform) prices because platforms compete more aggressively to sign up agents. The cross-group externality parameters a¤ect the magnitude of the feedback e¤ect. The higher the values of these parameters the lower the uniform equilibrium prices and pro…ts.
Under perfect price discrimination the feedback e¤ect is absent. 11 Let's explain why. We focus on group 1 agents. Each agent in equilibrium joins the platform that is closest to his "ideal" platform. When prices can be customized competition is for each agent individually. Each platform charges to the agents that are located in the rival platform's territory marginal cost prices and to its own agents a platform can charge a premium over marginal cost. This premium is equal to the transportation cost di¤erence a particular agent will incur by joining instead the rival platform and the di¤erence in the memberships of group 2 agents across the two platforms. The latter di¤erence is zero in a symmetric equilibrium. If a platform now lowers its price to a particular agent (or a group of agents) the platform will loose rents, but it will not sign up more agents. Due to the "limit price" nature of the problem under perfect price discrimination the feedback e¤ect disappears in equilibrium. Equilibrium discriminatory prices are free of the cross-group externality parameters. Furthermore, price discrimination, as it is well-known from one-sided models, intensi…es the competition. This e¤ect is also present in our model. But because the cross-group externalities are absent under perfect price discrimination and present when prices are uniform, we can conclude that when these externalities are strong perfect price discrimination leads to higher (average) prices and pro…ts.
Perfect price discrimination helps us to derive a clean prediction and also to extract a clear 1 0 Examples include newspapers and scholarly journals. Advertisers care about the number of people who read a particular newspaper and readers care about the number of advertisements in a newspaper. In the market of scholarly journals, authors care about the number of readers and readers care about the number of authors (research papers), McCabe and Snyder (2006) . 1 1 This result depends crucially on the assumption that prices cannot become negative. We o¤er a discussion on this in the main body of the paper.
intuition. But how much of our result is due to the assumption of perfect price discrimination? To answer this important question, we extend our model to allow for imperfect price discrimination. Platforms can segment the agents into groups but this segmentation is not perfect. In particular, we employ the segmentation approach that was developed in Liu and Serfes (2004) . 12 Platforms lack the necessary information needed to identify the preferences of each agent with perfect accuracy. Nevertheless, platforms possess some information which can be used to segment agents into groups. Each agent segment pays a di¤erent price. We allow the number of segments to vary exogenously in an attempt to capture the quality of information. A higher number of available segments implies that platforms can identify the preferences of each agent with higher precision (higher quality of consumer information). In the limit, we recover the perfect price discrimination paradigm. Imperfect price discrimination is interesting because it combines features from both the uniform pricing and the perfect discrimination cases. Further, it allows us to draw a more comprehensive picture of equilibrium pro…ts and welfare under varying levels of quality of consumer information.
We examine two di¤erent cases depending on whether all prices are observed by all agents before they join a platform. In the …rst case, we assume that prices are public. This assumption may not be very realistic when platforms discriminate via many prices, but it can serve as a benchmark case. Also, it may not be a bad assumption if the number of segments (and hence prices) is small. In the second case, we assume that agents observe each platform's two regular prices (one for each group), but they do not observe the targeted discounts o¤ the regular prices. Each agent only observes the discount that is o¤ered to him (private prices). This distinction matters in the presence of network externalities. 13 We show that equilibrium pro…ts can be non-monotonic (U-shaped) with respect to the quality of agent information, regardless of whether prices are public or private. Competition is more intense when prices are public. A price cut to a speci…c agent segment that is observed by everyone also attracts agents from other segments to the platform. So, targeted price cuts are more lucrative when they are publicly observed than when they are not. This suggests that …rms have incentives to make prices less transparent. The U-shape pattern of the equilibrium pro…ts with respect to the degree of segmentation (quality of information) implies that price discrimination hurts the platform pro…ts (relative to the uniform price pro…ts) when the quality of information is low. When the quality of information is high-and unlike the case in one-sided markets-price discrimination can bene…t the platforms.
When the market is a B2B market, then our result implies that price discrimination will lead to higher input prices if and only if platforms have detailed information about the preferences of the participants. To arrive at this result, we assume that each …rm is seeking to buy only one unit of the input and each input seller sells only one unit. The platforms facilitate the matching process between the two sides [as in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) ]. Let's assume that platforms have very good information about the agents. If platforms are allowed to customize their prices then …rms end up paying higher prices for the right to trade a unit of the input. Now if we assume that the prices the participants pay to join a platform do not a¤ect the bargaining process between an input supplier and a …rm that will ensue once a matching takes place, then a higher price charged by a platform will lead to a higher overall price a …rm will have to pay in order to acquire its input. If …rms can pass part of this extra cost on to consumers, then price discrimination is anti-competitive. However, the reverse may be true if platforms do not possess very detailed information about the participants. In this case the cost of acquiring the input is reduced due to price discrimination. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2007) also allow for price discrimination. In Caillaud and Jullien agents in each group are homogeneous and therefore price discrimination means di¤erent prices charged to each group of agents, while within each group the price is constant. This is also the meaning of price discrimination in Armstrong (2007) , although he allows for heterogeneous populations of agents. In contrast, we allow the prices within each group to vary. Price discrimination in Armstrong's model can lead to higher or lower prices and pro…ts, but the condition that determines the pro…tability of price discrimination is qualitatively di¤erent from the condition (and intuition) we derive in this paper. In Armstrong the di¤erences between: i) the degrees of platform di¤erentiation and ii) the cross-group externalities across groups play an important role. In contrast, in our paper the levels matter. As a consequence, if we assume complete symmetry (i.e., same degrees of platform di¤erentiation and same cross-group externalities across groups) then price discrimination always yields the same prices and pro…ts with uniform prices in Armstrong's paper. In our paper, however, this is not the case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we perform the analysis assuming that platforms can target each agent perfectly. We relax the perfect price discrimination assumption is section 4. We conclude we section 5. The appendix contains the proofs of propositions.
The description of the benchmark model
The benchmark model we develop is similar to Armstrong's (2007) modeling framework. There are two groups of agents`= 1; 2 and two horizontally di¤erentiated platforms k = A; B. We will denote the "other"group of agents by m. We capture platform di¤erentiation as follows. There is a continuum of agents of group`that is distributed on the [0; 1] interval according to the distribution function F`( ) with density f`. The distributions are independent across the two groups of agents and symmetric about Denote by n`k the number of participants from group`that platform k attracts. The maximum willingness to pay for a member of group`if he joins platform k is given by V + `nmk , where V is a standalone bene…t each agent receives independent of the number of participants from the other group on platform k. The parameter `> 0 measures the cross-group externality for group participants. The indirect utility of an agent from group`who is located at point x 2 [0; 1] is given by,
where p`k (x) is platform k's lump-sum charge to a group`participant who is located at point x and n e mk denotes the expectations agents from group`have about how many agents from group m will join platform k. Under a uniform pricing rule prices are constant across all agents in the same group (prices are allowed to vary across groups), while under discriminatory pricing the price each agent pays depends on his preferences (location). We assume that V is high enough which ensures that the market is covered. The costs are zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, the two platforms make, simultaneously, their pricing decisions. In stage 2, the agents decide which platform to join.
Analysis
First, we solve for a symmetric equilibrium assuming that each platform charges uniform prices to the agents of each group. Second, we assume that each platform can price discriminate perfectly the agents of each group. We assume that agents have rational expectations about how many agents will join each platform.
No price discrimination
Each agent observes all prices before he decides which platform to join, [e.g., Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2007) ]. The location of the marginal agent from group`, who is indi¤erent between A and B, is given by,
where n e mA = F m (x è ) and n e mB = 1 F (x è ). Therefore, the implicit functions for the market shares are given by,
Since expectations are rational we must have x`= x è , or n e mk = n mk . By invoking the implicit function theorem we can derive the e¤ect of prices on the market shares,
and
.
For the Jacobian of the system of the implicit functions to have a non-zero determinant it must be that t 2 1 2 f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) 6 = 0, for all x 1 and x 2 . We further assume that t 2 1 2 f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) > 0, for all x 1 and x 2 .
The platforms'pro…t functions are given by,
The …rst order conditions of platform A are given by,
Each …rst order condition has three terms. Suppose platform A lowers its price for group`. The …rst two terms in each …rst order condition capture the reduction in inframarginal rents and the increase in marginal consumers respectively. Since more agents from group`join platform k, platform k becomes more attractive to the members of group m. The third term represents the additional revenue from the increase in the number of agents from group m that join platform k. (This third e¤ect will be absent when platforms price discriminate perfectly).
We look for a symmetric equilibrium where platforms charge the same prices to each group. We assume that regularity conditions hold so that a symmetric sharing equilibrium exists. 14 Using (3), the symmetric solution to the system of …rst order conditions is given by,
Each platform serves one half of the members of each group. The equilibrium prices depend positively on the di¤erentiation parameter t, negatively on the strength of the cross-group externality `a nd negatively on the number of marginal agents f` 1 2 . When the externality for group`is stronger …rms o¤er lower prices to the members of group m. Potentially, the price can be negative, but we do not allow for this possibility (so we assume that t > max 1 f 2
). The implication of this assumption is that di¤erentiation is more important than cross-group externality.
The equilibrium pro…ts are,
Uniform distribution
If we assume that the distribution is uniform, then the equilibrium prices and pro…ts are,
3.2 Perfect price discrimination
Prices are public
Now we assume that platforms can discriminate perfectly and prices cannot be negative. (Below we discuss how the equilibrium changes when prices are allowed to be negative). Agent utility is given by (1) and platforms compete on an agent by agent basis. Each agent receives a targeted o¤er. Arbitrage is not feasible. We assume that agents observe all prices before they decide which platform to join. We make this assumption in order to be consistent with the uniform price case. We discuss about how our results might change if we relax the assumption that all prices are public in the next section.
The symmetric equilibrium is, p`A = t (1 2x) and p`B = 0, for x 1 2 and (8)
Each agent is indi¤erent between the two platforms, and we assume that he joins the one that is closest to his location. It is easy to see that no platform has an incentive to deviate from (8) . The price platform A (say) charges to agents located in its own turf is a limit price. It is a price that prevents the rival platform from making any sales to these agents. Hence, an equilibrium discriminatory price does not balance the same three e¤ects a uniform price does. Rather, the primary purpose of a price is to drive the rival platform out of the market for each agent. The premium a platform can charge is equal to the transportation di¤erence an agent will incur if he instead joins the rival platform. In addition, a platform can enjoy an extra premium if it has acquired more agents, but in a symmetric equilibrium this premium vanishes. Therefore, cross-group externalities do not a¤ect the equilibrium prices when …rms have the ability to price discriminate perfectly. In this respect, the equilibrium prices are the same with those from a one-sided market. 15 The equilibrium pro…ts are given by,
If the distribution is uniform, then the equilibrium pro…ts are equal to t 2 . Remark (allowing for negative prices). If we allow for negative prices, then (8) is no longer an equilibrium. Each platform has an incentive to lower its price below zero by " in order to attract the rival platform's agents and then raise its prices to its own agents. Such a deviation is pro…table. The symmetric equilibrium in this case is, 16 p`A = t (1 2x) m and p`B = m , for x 1 2 and (9)
As one can immediately see prices are a¤ected by the cross-group externality parameter. However, in many cases negative prices are unrealistic [see also Armstrong (2007) for a discussion on this issue]. Moreover, the above equilibrium is not very plausible. Here, we assume that agents in 0; 1 2 , for example, who are also indi¤erent between the two platforms join platform A. But what if we allow agents to make small mistakes (trembles) and instead join platform B? Is B ready to honor its commitment and pay these agents 1 or 2 (or sell the product at prices below marginal cost)? This does not seem very likely since platform B will loose money on these agents without being able to recoup its loses by raising its prices to its own agents. Although (9) is an equilibrium, it is not a very "plausible" one. Finally, when prices are private (which may be a more realistic assumption in the presence of so many prices) (8) is an equilibrium, even when prices can become negative. In other words, the credible signal that the negative price sends to the whole market disappears once prices cannot be observed publicly.
For all these reasons, in the remaining of the paper we assume that prices cannot become negative.
Prices are private
So far we have assumed that prices are public. We recognize that this assumption may not be very realistic in the context of perfect price discrimination. Alternatively, we can assume that platforms target each consumer with private coupons that represent discounts o¤ the regular prices. 17 Given the cross-group externalities, beliefs are important in this case. What is an agent's belief about the o¤ers made to other agents if he receives an out-of equilibrium o¤er? We could then assume that beliefs are passive [e.g., McAfee and Schwartz (1994)]. If price o¤ers were secret, and beliefs were passive, then (8) would continue to constitute an equilibrium. To see this, suppose that a platform raises unilaterally its prices to a group of agents in its territory. Each agent, however, continues to believe that market shares will not change and given that agents are indi¤erent, in equilibrium, between the two platforms they will all switch to the rival platform. Hence, such a deviation is unpro…table. Price cuts would also be unpro…table because a reduction in price to an agent (or a group of agents) will not lead to higher market share. The distinction between public and private prices does make a di¤erence in the imperfect price discrimination case that we examine later.
Price comparison
We compare the equilibrium uniform prices given by (6) with the discriminatory prices given by (8) . We will exploit the fact that uniform prices depend on the cross-group externality parameters, while discriminatory price do not. Discriminatory prices, as it is the case in one-sided markets that are characterized by horizontal di¤erentiation, are decreasing in the degree of consumer loyalty to 1 7 We note that the analysis of the previous section (i.e., the uniform prices case) is not a¤ected because we can reasonably assume that agents observe each platform's regular prices. In general, when prices are private platforms face a problem similar to the commitment problem in bilateral contracting contexts with externalities, e.g., Segal and Whinston (2003) . Platforms would have an incentive to raise their prices under passive beliefs. This is because when price changes are secret a price increase is not very costly due to the absence of the feedback e¤ect. The next section con…rms this intuition. a platform. Agents located very close to one or the other platform pay higher prices than those located in the middle. The highest price is t and the lowest is 0. If we compare these prices with the no discriminatory prices,
, we will see that it is possible that nearly all agents pay higher prices under price discrimination if `i s arbitrarily close to
. It then becomes obvious that there exists a threshold for the cross-group externality parameters above which perfect price discrimination hurts the platforms'pro…ts.
When the distribution is uniform, equilibrium pro…ts increase with price discrimination if and only if
. This is the case if and only if,
Furthermore, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a market sharing equilibrium to exist is 2t > ( 1 + 2 ). Therefore, there exists a range of parameters such that uniform equilibrium prices are given by (6) and price discrimination leads to higher pro…ts.
Armstrong (2007) compares price discrimination with uniform prices. In his model price discrimination is de…ned as the uniform pricing rule in our model, i.e., when platforms charge each group a di¤erent price. A uniform pricing rule in Armstrong's model is when a platform charges both groups the same price. Armstrong shows that price discrimination is pro…table if and only if,
Our condition (10) for a pro…table price discrimination is very di¤erent from Armstrong's condition (11) . In our case the levels matter, whereas in Armstrong's case the di¤erences matter more. If the transportation parameters are the same across groups (t 1 = t 2 ), as it is the case in our model, then price discrimination is never pro…table in Armstrong's model, while it may be in our model. Finally, as it is well-known [e.g., Thisse and Vives (1988)], price discrimination in one-sided markets when preferences are uniformly distributed and …rms are symmetric is always a prisoners' dilemma. The pro…ts under perfect price discrimination are t 4 , while under a uniform pricing rule they are t 2 . In contrast, in two-sided markets, when (10) is satis…ed the game is not a prisoners' dilemma. Firms in one-sided markets have "more incentives" to eliminate the practice of price discrimination than in two-sided markets. Because information about consumer tastes facilitates price discrimination one would expect that …rms in two-sided markets will seek to develop and acquire customer databases more aggressively than their counterparts in one-sided markets.
Imperfect price discrimination
Now we relax the assumption of perfect price discrimination. Rather, we assume that platforms can segment the agents into groups, but this segmentation is not perfect. Platforms can develop or acquire information which helps them to segment the agents into distinct groups based upon To make the analysis tractable, we assume that the distribution of preferences is uniform and 1 = 2 = .
We further assume that N = 2 i ; where i takes on all integer values, i = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4:::. Hence, N will parameterize the precision of agent information, with higher N 's being associated with higher information precision. Moreover, N = 1 corresponds to no price discrimination and N = 1 to perfect price discrimination. Note that N , for simplicity, does not take on all integer values, but rather N = 1; 2; 4; 8; 16:::(i.e., information re…nement). We assume that information of precision N is available to both platforms and that the current state of technology dictates N which the …rms take as exogenously given. Hence, our approach is static and the e¤ect of information improvements on the equilibrium is captured by comparative statics analysis.
To be consistent with the previous analysis, …rst we assume that consumers observe all the prices before they choose which platform to join. This assumption seems reasonable when the number of segments is small. An alternative assumption is that agents receive targeted discounts and therefore each agent observes only his own price (and the regular (highest) prices). In the previous section we showed that this distinction does not matter as long as beliefs are passive. However, under imperfect price discrimination, the analysis will change. So, we also derive the equilibrium by assuming that prices are private.
Prices are public
We denote by n`k s the number of agents from group`in segment s that join platform k. Then, the total number of agents from group`that join platform k is given by n`k = N P s=1 n`k s . The marginal agent from group`in segment s is given by,
From (12) the implicit expressions for the segment s shares are given by,
n e 1B ) p 2As + p 2Bs + t 2t
for s = 1; :::; N . Now we sum up over all segments. This yields,
Since expectations are rational we must have n`k = P N s=1 n`k s = n è k . Solving (15) and (16) with respect to n`k,`= 1; 2 and k = A; B, we obtain the aggregate market shares explicitly as a function of prices,
Next, we substitute (17) and (18) into (13) and (14) to obtain the segment shares n`k s ,`= 1; 2, k = A; B and s = 1; :::; N . Segment s demand depends on all 4N prices.
We denote by p Ǹ k = (p`k 1 ; p`k 2 ; :::; p`k N ) the n-dimensional vector of prices charged by platform k to the agents of group`. The platforms'pro…t functions are then given by,
Each platform chooses p N 1k and p N 2k to maximize pro…ts, given the two vectors of the rival platform. The presence of the externalities complicates the problem. This is due to the fact that we cannot treat each segment separately from the other segments, as it would be the case if the externalities were absent [see Liu and Serfes (2004 , proposition 1) ]. In two-sided markets a price a platform charges to agents in a particular segment a¤ects the number of agents from that segment who join the platform which, in turn, a¤ects the number of agents from the other group that join this and other segments of the platform. Nevertheless, we built on the results in Liu and Serfes (2004) and we were able to characterize the symmetric equilibrium as the following proposition demonstrates. We maintain the assumption that brand di¤erentiation is more important than externalities, i.e., t > .
Proposition 1 (Prices are public). The symmetric equilibrium is described as follows:
Suppose that platforms can segment each group of agents into two segments, i.e., N = 2. Assuming that t > 2 a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is described as follows: 18 1. If t > 3 the equilibrium pro…ts are
Platforms share each segment demand and charge positive prices in all agent segments.
If t 2 (2 ; 3 ] the equilibrium pro…ts are
Platforms charge zero prices in the rival platform's agent segment and positive prices in their own segment. Platforms do not make any sales in the segments that are in the rival platform's own territory.
Suppose that platforms can segment each group into more than two segments, i.e., N 4. If t N 2 , then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. The equilibrium pro…ts are
Platforms do not share any segment demand, which implies that each agent joins the platform that is closest to his location.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 says the following. First let's assume that N 4. Fix t and . Equilibrium pro…ts do not depend on when t N 2 . (Note that the latter condition is not very restrictive especially when N is large). This is because platforms do not share any segment demand and the price is a limit price. On the other hand, the uniform price equilibrium pro…ts, from (7), are equal to t . It can be easily seen that t (and assuming that t < 2 , i.e., platforms are not too di¤erentiated), see …gure 3. 19 In the remaining of this section we maintain the assumption that t < 2 . Therefore, if N >Ñ , (and platforms are not too di¤erentiated) then price discrimination with symmetric platforms leads to higher pro…ts than those under uniform prices. For example, if t = 1 and = :6, thenÑ = 10. This implies that price discrimination is pro…table for the platforms when they have the ability to segment each group of agents into at least ten segments (i.e., N 10). (Recall that our de…nition of segmentation allows the number of segments to go from 2 to 4 to 8 and so forth). Thus, we see that the result we derived by assuming perfect price discrimination continues to hold even when …rms discriminate imperfectly, provided that the quality of information is high enough. Now let's assume that N = 2. The equilibrium in this case requires that t > 2 which contradicts the assumption, t < 2 , that we made above (and we maintain in the rest of the paper). We need this condition because otherwise prices become zero and the equilibrium may involve tipping. We do not pursue the possibility of tipping further. If, for a moment, we assume that t > 2 , then proposition 1 holds (for N = 2) and we can easily observe that equilibrium pro…ts are lower than the uniform price pro…ts, i.e., t(t 2 )(t ) (3 2t) 2 5t 9 < t . Overall, the relationship between equilibrium pro…ts and the quality of information N is U-shaped, see …gure 3. In drawing …gure 3 we assumed, for convenience, that N is a continuous variable and that t < 2 . Moreover, we reasonably assumed that the pro…ts for the platforms when N = 2 cannot be greater than the pro…ts in proposition 1 (where t > 2 is assumed).
Prices are private
We assume that agents observe each platform's regular (highest) prices, but they do not observe all the targeted discounts o¤ the regular prices. Each agent only observes the price o¤ers made to him. Agents form conjectures about the membership of each platform that must be con…rmed in equilibrium. An unexpected deviation by a platform is not going to be observed by anyone, except the segment of agents which the price deviation targets. We assume that beliefs are passive. Hence, a deviation will only have an e¤ect on the demand in the targeted agent segment and nowhere else. Platforms share the segment demand only in the middle two segments. The equilibrium pro…ts are given by,
The equilibrium pro…t exhibits a U-shape as a function of N .
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of proposition 1 in Liu and Serfes (2004) where there are no externalities.
We know from one-sided markets that price discrimination gives rise to two e¤ects: an intensi…ed competition e¤ect and a surplus extraction e¤ect, Liu and Serfes (2004) . When the segmentation is coarse the …rst e¤ect is more dominant. As platforms move to …ner partitions the second effect becomes increasingly stronger. Overall, the relationship between equilibrium pro…ts and the number of available consumer segments (quality of information) is U-shaped. Moreover, the equilibrium pro…ts are always below the uniform price pro…ts. In two-sided markets the aforementioned two e¤ects are also present. An additional e¤ect is due to the cross-group externalities. Network externalities a¤ect the equilibrium prices when a segment demand is shared and prices are public. Otherwise, they do not in ‡uence the equilibrium prices. Nevertheless, externalities a¤ect the equilibrium indirectly in the following sense. When prices are public price cuts are more lucrative precisely because of the externalities. This forces the platforms to compete more vigorously and leads to an equilibrium where each platform drives the rival platform out of all of the segments in its own turf. Equilibrium prices are independent of the externalities since sharing of segment demand does not take place (prices are limit prices). This is the case when N 4 as proposition 1 documents.
Price and pro…t comparison
Equilibrium pro…ts when prices are private are higher than the pro…ts when prices are public, see …gure 3. This comparison is straightforward when N 4 based on (21) and (22) . Both pro…t functions converge to t 2 (the pro…t under perfect price discrimination) as N goes to in…nity. When N = 2 the pro…ts when prices are private are (from (22)) k = 5t 9 . This pro…t is greater than the pro…t ( (19) and (20)) when prices are public. Essentially, the externalities push the uniform pro…ts and the discriminatory pro…ts with public prices down. They do not a¤ect, however, the pro…ts when prices are private. Moreover, the discriminatory pro…ts with public prices are a¤ected less than the uniform pro…ts When prices are public and N 4 (and t N 2 ) the outcome is e¢ cient because each agent joins the platform that is closest to his location. This is not true when prices are private where some agents (those in the middle two segments) do not join the closest platform.
Conclusion
We examine the issue of price discrimination in two-sided markets. We assume that there are two symmetric horizontally di¤erentiated platforms and two groups of agents. Agents from both groups must join a platform for successful trades to take place. Platforms possess information about the agents'brand preferences which can be used to customize prices. Our …rst result indicates that when the externality e¤ect is strong perfect price discrimination yields higher pro…ts to the platforms relative to the pro…ts under uniform prices. This result is in sharp contrast with the prisoners' dilemma prediction in oligopolistic one-sided price discrimination models.
Then, we allow for imperfect price discrimination. We analyze two di¤erent cases depending on whether agents observe all prices before they decide which platform to join: i) prices are private and ii) prices are public. This distinction is relevant for two reasons. First, when platforms charge many prices it seems reasonable (at least in some cases) to assume that not all prices are observed by all agents. Second, observability matters due to the presence of network externalities. We demonstrate that in either case the equilibrium pro…ts exhibit a U-shape pattern with respect to the quality of information platforms possess about the preferences of the agents. In the limit, i.e., as the quality of information tends to become perfect, we recover the perfect price discrimination paradigm. This suggests that when the information is not very accurate price discrimination makes the platforms worse o¤, while with accurate information price discrimination may be pro…table.
Moreover, pro…ts, when prices are public, are always lower compared to the pro…ts when prices are private. An implication of this result is that platforms may have incentives to make their prices less transparent. Our analysis can also be used in intermediate goods markets, such as B2B markets. In this case, price discrimination will lead to lower …nal prices if and only if market segmentation is coarse.
A Proof of proposition 1
The proof is divided into two parts. In the …rst part we solve for the equilibrium assuming that the number of segments is two, N = 2. In the second part we assume that N 2. We do this because there is a qualitative di¤erence in the solution between the two cases. In the …rst case …rms may share the segment demand, whereas in the second case segment demand is not shared (under some conditions). The incumbent platform is able to drive the rival out of all segments in its own territory. Platform A's own territory is the 0; 1 2 part of the intervals and platform B's own territory is the 1 2 ; 1 part. When we say "incumbent platform" we refer to the platform that is operating in its own territory.
Case 1: N = 2. So each platform can charge two prices to a given group of agents. This implies that each platform competes with four prices.
Let p`k s denote platform k's price in segment s for group`. It can be showed (details are omitted) that when t > 2 , each …rm's pro…t function is concave in its own prices. The implication of concavity is that in equilibrium neither …rm will corner the market.
Prices in all segments are positive.
In this case …rst order conditions that are satis…ed with equality are necessary and su¢ cient.
We calculate the …rst order conditions, 20 and we assume symmetry in prices across …rms
Then, we solve the …rst order conditions to obtain p`A 1 = 2t 3 and p`A 2 = t 3 ,`= 1; 2.
When t > 3 , both prices are positive. By substituting the above prices back into the pro…t function, we can obtain the equilibrium pro…ts,
No unilateral deviation is pro…table because the objective functions are strictly concave.
One price is positive and the other price is zero.
When t 3 , one price becomes zero. This is the price that each platform charges to the agents in the rival platform's own territory, i.e., p`A 2 = p`B 1 = 0, for`= 1; 2. By following similar steps as above and assuming that platform A obtains zero pro…t in segment 2 and positive pro…t only from segment 1 we can obtain the prices for platform A that satisfy the …rst order conditions (from symmetry we can derive the prices for platform B) p`A 1 = t( 2 + t) 3 + 2t , for`= 1; 2.
When t > 2 , each platform has positive price in its own turf for each group. Next, we consider a deviation. Due to symmetry, consider platform A only. There is no pro…table deviation in p`A 1 , = 1; 2, due to the strict concavity of the pro…t function. The only possible deviation is for platform A to increase p`A 2 ,`= 1; 2 above zero. We show that this is not pro…table (details are omitted). , where market segmentation is modeled the same way as in the present paper, we showed that …rms share the segment demand only in the middle two segments, while in the other segments the incumbent …rm drives the rival …rm out of the market. This is true for any N 4. The di¤erence between that paper and the present paper is that the model in Liu and Serfes (2004) is one-sided. This implies that the feedback e¤ect is absent. The feedback e¤ect intensi…es the competition and leads to lower prices, implying that the incumbent platform has more incentives to drive the rival out of the market. Hence, platforms in the present paper cannot share more than the middle two segments.
Claim 2:
In any pure strategy equilibrium prices in the middle two segments must be zero.
Let p`A M 1 and p`A M 2 denote platform A's prices in the two middle segments in both groups, = 1; 2. So, platform B's prices are p`B M 1 and p`B M 2 , for`= 1; 2.
We …rst prove that p`k M 1 > 0 and p`k M 2 > 0,`= 1; 2 and k = A; B cannot be an equilibrium. Let's focus on platform A. Assume an in…nitesimal change of the prices, say dp`A M 1 and dp`A M 2 , = 1; 2, such that platform A would lose market share, dn`A,`= 1; 2, in the two middle segments. Then a price change of dp`A M 1 and dp`A M 2 ,`= 1; 2 would lead to a gain of market share of dn`A,`= 1; 2.
Let d L denote the aggregate (i.e., both groups combined) change in platform A's pro…t in segments s = 1; :::; m 1 , i.e., left segments, d M in the two middle segments, s = M 1 ; M 2 , and d R the change in the right segments, s = m 2 ; :::; N . Obviously d R = 0. For platform A not to …nd the dp`A M 1 and dp`A M 2 ,`= 1; 2 change pro…table, it must be that the resulting pro…t goes down, i.e,
After platform A loses share in the middle segments, we can show that it will not …nd it in its best interest to drive platform B out of the market in segment M 1 , and possibly not in some other left segments as well. But suppose that platform A, suboptimaly, still drives platform B out of the market in all left segments s = 1; :::; m 1 , and let d 0 L be the corresponding pro…t change. Then we have,
Now consider a price decrease of dp`A M 1 and dp`A M 2 ,`= 1; 2. The corresponding pro…t change is d
d R > 0 since platform A will gain some share in each right segment s = m 2 ; :::; N . This is because platform A lowered its prices.
For platform A not to …nd the dp`A M 1 and dp`A M 2 ,`= 1; 2 change pro…table, it must be that the resulting pro…t goes down, i.e,
But this is impossible, since from (23) d 0 L d M 0 and d R > 0. Therefore, if platform A has no incentive to increase its prices, it will certainly have incentives to lower them, which implies that strictly positive prices in the middle two segments cannot be an equilibrium.
Next we prove that p`A M 1 > 0, p`A M 2 = 0, p`B M 1 = 0 and p`B M 2 > 0, for`= 1; 2 cannot be an equilibrium either.
The logic is the same as above, except that when p`A M 1 decreases, there is not only gain in the right segments (as above), but also gain in the second middle segment, which will strengthen our argument.
Claim 3: When t N 2 , zero prices in the middle two segments constitute an equilibrium. The prices in the remaining segments are limit prices that drive the rival platform out of the incumbent platform's territory. Hence, p`A s = 0 for all s = M 1 ; :::; N and p`B s = 0 for all s = 1; :::; M 2 . Moreover, p`A s = t To sum up, our symmetric candidate equilibrium involves zero prices in the middle two segments and limit prices in all the remaining segments where the incumbent platform drives the rival out of the markets in its own turf. In the absence of indirect externalities this is not an equilibrium. A platform would have incentives to unilaterally raise its middle prices above zero [as in Liu and Serfes (2004) ]. What may prevent a platform from doing so is the loss of market share in the middle segments and the resulting loss of pro…ts in all the remaining segments due to the crossgroup externalities. To prove that such a deviation is indeed unpro…table we take a shortcut. When a platform deviates in the middle two segments we allow the indirect externality to a¤ect only the adjacent segments. Below, we explain how we check for such a deviation.
Due to symmetry, consider only platform A's deviation. Fix platform B's prices. Let p dev AM 1 and p dev AM 2 ,`= 1; 2, denote platform A's deviating prices in the two middle segments. Platform A does not have incentives to change its prices in the left or right segments. In the left segments it is capturing all the segment demand, while in the right segments its prices and market share are zero.
Note that platform A can only increase its prices in the …rst middle segments by charging p dev AM 1 > 0,`= 1; 2. In the second middle segments a price increase will clearly be unpro…table (since the segment is in platform B's own territory). When platform A increases its prices in the …rst middle segments, it will loose market share in those segments. It may also loose market share in other segments as well. We assume that platform A deviates in the …rst middle two segments and we also consider the feedback e¤ect in the adjacent two segments m 1 , i.e., in the segments that are adjacent to the left of the …rst middle segments. We ignore the feedback e¤ect in the remaining segments. The resulting pro…ts are denoted by^ and then calculate d^ dev A dp`A M 1
. We …nd that d^ dev A dp`A M 1 p`A M 1 =0 0,`= 1; 2, when t N 2 :
The above condition is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for a local deviation to be unpro…table. Since^ A ensures that no deviation is pro…table when we consider the true deviation pro…ts. Hence, our candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
